Torts--Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity--Scope of Retained Immunity--Jones v. State Hightway Commission by Scott, Donald G.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 43 
Issue 2 Spring 1978 Article 14 
Spring 1978 
Torts--Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity--Scope of Retained 
Immunity--Jones v. State Hightway Commission 
Donald G. Scott 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donald G. Scott, Torts--Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity--Scope of Retained Immunity--Jones v. State 
Hightway Commission , 43 MO. L. REV. (1978) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/14 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RECENT CASES
tent administrative or criminal sanctions to both parties for their respec-
tive violations. Because the tippee's maximum liability in the Tarasi
context would be for attempted fraud, the risk of sanctions for that vio-
lation probably would not outweigh the tippee's interest in recovering his
losses, especially if they were large. In this way, each party would be
held responsible for his own misdeeds, and neither would escape un-
penalized.
The Tarasi decision solidifies judicial support for a position which
insufficiently serves the objectives of rule 1Ob-5 and the implied civil
action in the tippee-tipper situation. Denial of recovery to the tippee will
have little deterrent effect on securities violations and will provide un-
warranted insulation from liability to the tipper. In pari delicto is a com-
mon law defense developed in cases involving purely individual equities;
the Tarasi court overlooked a substantial public interest consideration by
applying the defense in a suit brought under remedial legislation. The
holding is inconsistent with a marked trend to interpret the securities
laws as an expansion of the common law, both to effectuate their broad
remedial purposes 49 and to insure uniformity of enforcement.5 0 In pari
delicto hinders the enforcement of rule 1Ob-5 through the medium of
private suits. The consequences of letting an occasional unscrupulous in-
vestor recover his losses are outweighed by the salutary policing effect
which the private suit can have above and beyond the threat of gov-
ernmental action.
GEORGE E. MuRRAY iII
TORTS -ABROGATION OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-
SCOPE OF RETAINED IMMUNITY
Jones v. State Highway Commission I
Jean Jones was driving south on highway 71 in Jackson County,
Missouri, when the road curved to the right and her automobile went
off the left side. The shoulder was four inches below the road's surface
49. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)(interpreting similar antifraud provisions in the Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970)).
50. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
1. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
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and was not evenly graded; when Jones tried to return to the road she
lost control of her automobile. The car ran off the opposite side of the
road into a highway sign set in concrete and rolled down an embank-
ment. Jones filed suit for personal injuries against the state highway
commission and alleged both negligent design and maintenance and
failure to warn of the dangerous and defective condition of the highway.
A second count alleged that the highway's condition constituted a public
nuisance.' Three companion cases were argued and decided with
Jones.3
In these four actions alleging negligence on the part of gov-
ernmental agencies at various levels, the Missouri Supreme Court finally
took the responsibility for abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity 4 it had repeatedly left for the legislature to dismantle. 5 The opinion
is unusual in its unreserved adoption of the views expressed in the
opinion of Judge Finch, dissenting two years earlier in O'Dell v. School
District of Independence.6 In O'Dell Judge Finch outlined how the Mis-
souri courts developed doctrines to limit governmental tort immunity.
7
Missouri was like most American jurisdictions in laying down a general
rule of immunity for injuries arising out of "governmental" functions,
but finding liability for tortious injury caused by the "proprietary" func-
tions of a governmental entity. 8 The governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion failed to produce consistent results.9
Discarding the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not result in
governmental liability for every injury caused by government operations.
As in several decisions abrogating sovereign immunity in other jurisdic-
2. Id. at 227.
3. Prewitt v. Parkway School Dist., 557 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. En Banc 1977)
(plaintiff injured slipping on a wet spot in a school hallway); Wheeler v. St. Clair
County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 557 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. En Banc 1977) (wrongful death
action arising from a hospital fire); State ex rel. Racer v. Richardson, 557 S.W.2d
235 (Mo. En Banc 1977) (medical malpractice in county hospital).
4. "We hold that sovereign immunity against tort liability is no longer a bar
to such actions...." Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 577 S.W.2d at 227.
5. O'Dell v. School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. En Banc
1975); Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1972); Smith v.Con-
solidated School Dist. No. 2, 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. En Banc 1966); Fette v. City of
St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963).
6. 521 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Mo. En Banc 1975) (Finch, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 417-19.
8. Id. See Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1363, 1386 (1954).
9. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. En Banc
1977). In O'Dell Judge Finch noted the anomaly of granting a cause of action to
a pedestrian injured due to the negligent maintenance of hazardous sidewalks
while denying a remedy to a pedestrian standing on the same sidewalk who is
injured by a falling traffic signal, on the theory that maintenance of streets and
sidewalks is a proprietary function but regulation of traffic is a governmental
function. 521 S.W.2d at 417-18. (Finch, J., dissenting).
388 [Vol. 43
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tions, 0 Jones reserved an area in which governmental entities retain im-
munity from tort actions:
[T]he liability is for torts committed in the execution of activity
decided upon, not for the decision itself in matters which go to
the essence of governing; ... our decision is not meant to im-
pose liability upon the state or any of its agencies for acts or
omissions constituting the exercise of a legislative, judicial, or
executive function."
Analogous reservations are common in state 12 and federal 13 statutes
providing for governmental liability for torts. Before Jones the govern-
ment was immune except for torts arising from the exercise of proprie-
tary functions; after Jones' 4 one can sue the government but not for
10. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1254, 429 S.W.2d 45, 53 (1968); Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957); Smith v. State, 93
Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937, 945 (1970); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d
738, 742 (Ky. App. 1964); Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 132, 235 N.W.2d
597, 603 (1975); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 1, 264 Minn. 279,
292-93, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962); Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430,
434-35, 160 N.W.2d 805, 808 (1968); Willis v. Department of Conservation and
Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 540, 264 A.2d 34, 37 (1970); Kitto v. Minot Park
Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 804-05 (N.D. 1974); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.
2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962).
11. 557 S.W.2d at 230. The original slip opinion read: "for acts or omissions
constituting the exercise of a legislative or judicial function or the exercise of an
executive or planning function." Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, No. 60017, slip
op. at 8 (Mo. En Banc Sept. 12, 1977) (emphasis added). On Nov. 14, 1977, it
was announced that some of the wording in the Sept. 12 slip opinion was mis-
takenly included from an earlier draft. The new version omitted any mention of
an exception to governmental liability for "planning functions." By revising its
language at this critical passage arguably the court intended to narrow the
exception to liability to fewer kinds of governmental functions than a formula
excepting planning functions would permit. It is not to be lightly assumed, how-
ever, that courts applying the exception will not find the widely accepted distinc-
tion between planning-level and operational-level decisions useful in segregating
those functions which will remain immune. A court may less readily classify a
function as legislative, for example, if it does not involve planning in the sense of
a conscious weighing of risks against advantages.
12. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West
1966); HAW. REv. STAT. § 662-15(1) (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (Supp.
1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(6) (1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8, 219(1)(a)(1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 41.032 (1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1754 (West
Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.265(2)(d) (1975); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-19(14)(7) (Vernon 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (1) (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.43 (3) (West
1966).
13. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970) provides: "The
provisions of this chapter... shall not apply to-(a) Any claim ... based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise to perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
14. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated prospectively as to all
claims arising on or after August 15, 1978. 557 S.W.2d at 231. Judge Finch
3
Scott: Scott: Torts--Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
injuries arising from legislative, judicial, or executive functions. If the
change is not to become purely cosmetic by expansive construction of
the exception to liabilty, it must be made clear what test will be used to
isolate the governmental decisions dealing with "matters which go to the
essence of governing" which will retain tort immunity. Beyond the pro-
nouncement that "clearly all of the petitions in the four cases before us
are sufficient to state a cause of action," 15 Jones sheds no light on the
test to be used.
This note will survey recent decisions and display the prevailing
judicial treatment of retained governmental tort immunity.' 6 It is very
likely that the Missouri General Assembly will enact legislation pertaining
to governmental tort liability, probably during the current session. Sev-
eral of the jurisdictions discussed herein operate under statutory waivers
of governmental tort immunity." Most such statutes provide for an ex-
ception to governmental liability modeled after that in the Federal Tort
Claims Act (F.T.C.A.); I other states have enacted statutory exceptions
to liability which are unique.' 9 The analysis also includes jurisdictions
that have abrogated governmental tort immunity but do not have a
statutory exception to liability.
2 0
Judge Finch's dissenting opinion in O'Dell endorsed the limitation on
liability laid down in Parish v. Pitts.11 Nearly identical language appears
argued for such prospective application in O'Dell, so the change would not take
effect until after the effective date for legislation adopted by the next regular
session of the General Assembly, in order to "give time for it to consider the
subject and then to enact such legislation as it deems appropriate." 521 S.W.2d at
422.
15. 557 S.W.2d at 230
16. Exhaustive treatment of construction of the discretionary function ex-
ception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970) is beyond the
scope of this survey. Several states will not be studied here for various reasons.
Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, and New Jersey have reinstated a general rule of
immunity with specified legislative exceptions and so do not fit the liability-with-
exceptions pattern now existing in Missouri. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp.
1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-104 to 24-10-117 (1973); KAN. STAT. § 46-901
(1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 59:2-10 (West Supp. 1977). Oklahoma's
statute defines municipalities so narrowly that only Tulsa and Oklahoma City fall
within the class of municipalities which will be liable for their torts (over 200,000
population), so many of the Oklahoma cases rely on the old governmental-pro-
prietary distinction. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1751-1766 (West Supp. 1977).
Othger states have so recently abolished governmental immunity that there has not
yet developed a clear picture of how any exceptions to liability will be handled
(e.g., New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, and West. Virginia).
17. See note 12 supra.
18. See note 13 supra. States having similar statutory exceptions are: Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah.
19. Texas and Wisconsin. See note 71 infra.
20. Ohio and Washington. See note 64 infra.
21. 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).
[Vol. 43
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in Kitto v. Minot Park District, 22 which cited the experience of the federal
courts applying the discretionary function exception to the F.T.C.A. as
providing a useful source of reference.2 3 The crucial distinction drawn
between a governmental decision and the "execution of activity decided
upon" may be found in the leading United States Supreme Court cases
interpreting the F.T.C.A.'s discretionary function exception, Dalehite v.
United States2 4 and Indian Towing Co. v. United States.25
Dalehite involved the execution of a plan approved by the cabinet for
shipping ammonium nitrate fertilizer to occupied countries following
World War II. The fertilizer was coated with paraffin, rosin, and pet-
rolatum and was -packed at 200* F. in paper bagging. Some of the pack-
aged fertilizer was loaded at Texas City, Texas, on a ship carrying a
cargo of explosives. A fire broke out in the fertilizer hold and the re-
sulting explosions left 560 people dead, 3000 injured, and much of the
city reduced to rubble. Tort claims totaling over $200,000,000 were filed
against the government. In a 4-3 decision (Douglas and Clark, J.J., not
participating), the Supreme Court denied recovery squarely on the
ground of the discretionary function exception and held that the excep-
tion immunizes not only "the initiation of programs and activities" but
also "determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations." 2 6 The majority opin-
ion provides little in the way of a guiding principle for application of the
exception to liability: "Where there is room for policy judgment and de-
cision there is discretion." 2 7 The Court found such "policy" judgments
had taken place when the specifications for the manufacture and pack-
aging of the fertilizer were drawn up. The majority opinion thus dis-
tinguished plans from operations, but did not consider that some negli-
gence may have occurred in the execution of the Field Director's plan:
"The decisions held culpable [by the district court] were all responsibly
made at a planning rather than operational level and involved consider-
ations more or less important to the practicability of the Government's
22. We hold that no tort action will lie against governmental units for
those acts which may be termed discretionary in character. Included
within this category are acts traditionally deemed legislative or
quasi-legislative, or judicial or quasi-judicial, in nature. The exercise
of discretion carries with it the right to be wrong. It is for torts
committed in the execution of the activity decided upon that liability
attaches, not for the decision itself.
224 N.W.2d 795, 804 (N.D. 1974). If legislative, judicial, and executive functions
are conceptually sub-classes of discretionary functions, the exception to gov-
ernmental liability set out in Jones is no broader than that in decisions applying a
statutory discretionary function exception.
23. Id. at 804-05.
24. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
25. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
26. 346 U.S. at 35-36.
27. Id. at 36.
1978]
5
Scott: Scott: Torts--Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
fertilizer program."2  It was this finding that Justice Jackson seized
upon in making out the argument of the dissenters in Dalehite.29 Jackson
contrasted cabinet-level policymaking with housekeeping-level execution
of policy that already had been settled upon, and maintained that delib-
erations at the housekeeping level are not within the exception because
such activities are analogous to activities for which private citizens are
routinely held liable. 30
The Court's decision in Indian Towing shows at least a shift in at-
titude from the position adopted by the majority in Dalehite. The Indian
Towing Company sued the government for the loss of cargo resulting
when a tugboat ran aground. It alleged that the Coast Guard negligently
failed to inspect and repair a lighthouse or failed to warn that the light
was not functioning. The government did not raise a discretionary im-
munity defense and conceded that the acts complained of were at the
operational level. However, the government argued that because the
F.T.C.A. was intended to make the government liable wherever private
persons would be liable 3 and because the operation of a lighthouse had
no private counterpart, there was no standard of conduct by which to
assess liability. The government's theory was analogous to that used by
municipalities claiming immunity for torts arising from governmental (as
opposed to proprietary) activities. 32 The attempt to read the gov-
ernmental-proprietary distinction into the F.T.C.A. was flatly rejected. 33
28. Id. at 41. The Dalehite majority suggested that the discretionary function
exception is most needed where "a subordinate performs or fails to perform a
causal step, each action or nonaction being directed by the superior, exercising,
perhaps abusing, . .. discretion." Id. at 36. The causal step of loading the fer-
tilizer on a ship also loaded with explosives may not have been an act directed by
the plans, but it also was not an act included in the district court's findings of
negligence. If the Dalehite decision requires that all decisions alleged to cause
plaintiffs injury be at the highest level of planning before the discretionary ex-
ception will immunize them, the dictum that "the acts of subordinates in carrying
out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be
actionable" is not so broad as critics have supposed. On this view, the difference
between the majority and the dissenters is primarily a factual one.
29. The common sense of this matter is that a policy adopted in the
exercise of an immune discretion was carried out carelessly by those
in charge of detail. We cannot agree that all the way down the line
there is immunity for every balancing of care against cost, of safety
against production, of warning against silence.
346 U.S. at 58. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
30. "Surely a statute so long debated was meant to include more than traffic
accidents. If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that 'The King can do no
wrong' has- not been uprooted; it has merely been amended to read, 'The King
can do only little wrongs'." Id. at 60. See Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Ex-
ception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEo. L.J. 81, 98 n.79 (1968).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
32. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 99.
33. "There is nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that Congress
intended to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapa-
[Vol. 43
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The Court found that although there was initially no duty to con-
struct a lighthouse, once the Coast Guard undertook to provide that ser-
vice, it was obligated to do so with care.3 4 This "undertaking" rule was
developed in earlier federal cases under the F.T.C.A.35 and has found
application in many subsequent federal cases.36
Three patterns have been identified in the reasoning of the federal
courts whether the act alleged to be tortious was an immune exercise of
discretion. 37 Similar patterns are evident in state decisions applying a
discretionary function exception to governmental tort liability in those
jurisdictions which have abandoned general immunity. Other grounds
for decision also have been advanced frequently enough to warrant dis-
cussion. Accordingly, state decisions using the following five tests for
finding an exception to governmental liability will be discussed: (1) the
"official zeal" or "dampening the ardor" test; (2) the broad semantic or
definitional test; (3) the "planning-operational" test (either coupled with
or independent of a requirement that the act or decision in question
involved basic policy considerations); (4) the "undertaking" test; and (5)
the legal duty test.
In the "official zeal" group of cases, a finding of immunity follows
from a concern that imposing liability would tend to inhibit officials
from enthusiastically performing their duties, out of fear of litigation. 3s
On the same day that the California Supreme Court did away with the
ble of being held in the mind for adequate formulation." 350 U.S. at 68. It is
worth noting that if governmental immunity were legislatively reinstated in the
wake of Jones, the courts almost certainly would continue to "chip and whittle
away at" the rule using this unsatisfactory distinction to avoid the harsh and
unjust results of the immunity doctrine. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557
S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. En Banc 1977); O'Dell v. School Dist. of Independence,
521 S.W.2d 403, 417-19 (Mo. En Banc 1975) (Finch, J., dissenting). For this
reason, the fact that the governmental-proprietary distinction results in inconsis-
tent findings provides an argument against legislative reinstatement of immunity
just as it provides an argument for judicial abrogation.
34. 350 U.S. at 69.
35. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 90.
36. See cases cited in United Air Lines v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 796, 447 P.2d
352, 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 250 (1968).
37. [The cases) (1) apply the rule suggested by Dalehite that planning-
level decisions are within the exception, and operational-level ones
are not; (2) ignore the fact that the exception was not really argued
or considered in Indian Towing, and apply that case's "good samari-
tan" rule; or (3) use a broad definition of "discretion" such as
applied by Dalehite.
Reynolds, supra note 30, at 103. State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 719"(Alaska
1972).
38. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). This approach
de-emphasizes the fact that the device of tort liability encourages officials to be
reasonably careful in the discharge of their duties; whatever the value of "un-
flinching" performance, it ought not be allowed to displace the value of careful
1978] RECENT CASES 393
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rule of governmental immunity from tort liability, 3 it also handed down
a decision recognizing a discretionary function exception to such liabil-
ity.4 ° The court thought this rule necessary so that the threat of judicial
review of officials' decisions would not impair official zeal. NeCasek v. City
of Los Angeles41 followed similar reasoning. The court conceived its task
to be determining whether a risk of dampening official ardor was pre-
sent. The court found such a risk- was present and concluded that the
defendant police officers' alleged negligence was immune as involving
the exercise of discretion. The California Supreme Court later came to
reject the official zeal argument on the ground that statutory provisions
for indemnification of officials obviate this concern.42
Several cases have attempted to lay down a definition of "discretion"
which can be more or less mechanically applied to various factual situa-
tions. Typically such definitions are very broad, and if literally followed
would restore governmental immunity to a wider class of cases than be-
fore the abandonment of the immunity doctrine. An early California de-
cision defined governmental acts which would remain immune from lia-
bility as "those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of
conduct one must or must not take ... .,,43 In NeCasek the court held
that the exercise of an official's powers is immune if the powers are "to
be exerted or withheld according to his own judgment as to what is
necessary and proper."44 Silver v. City of Minnesota 45 defined immune
performance. For criticism of this "dampen the ardor" approach, see Johnson v.
State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 792, 447 P.2d 352, 358-60, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 247 (1968);
Comment, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception: Political
Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA L. REv. 930, 971 n.202
(1971); Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No Clothes, 1966
U. ILL. L.F. 828, 842; Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed Construction of
the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207, 224 (1956).
39. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961).
40. Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 359
P.2d 465, 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961) ("government officials are not person-
ally liable for their discretionary acts within the 'scope of their authority even
though it is alleged that their conduct was malicious").
41. 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965).
42. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 790, 447 P.2d 352, 358, 73 Cal. Rptr.
240, 246 (1968). For a large class of public employees in Missouri, the Tort
Defense Fund provisions have a similar impact. V.A.M.S. § 105.710 (Supp.
1978). "As part of the compensation to be paid to ... [listed groups of state
employees] the commissioner of administration is hereby authorized to pay ...
all final judgments ... against the aforesaid ... for acts arising out of and per-
formance in connection with their official duties on behalf of the state." The Act
also provides that the Attorney General's office may defend such employee at
trial.
43. Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 331, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51
(1962).
44. 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 135, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294, 297 (1965).
45. 284 Minn. 266, 269, 170 N.W.2d 206, 208 (1969) (police and firemen
immune where plaintiff's store was burned during a riot). This definition was
[Vol. 43
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functions as those involving the "power or right of acting officially ac-
cording to what appears best and appropriate under the circumstances."
In Smith v. Cooper the Dalehite definition of discretion was adopted. 46
While some definitions are better than others, 47 reliance on a definition
tends to produce uneven results to the extent that the rule comes to be
applied without consideration of the reasons for excepting certain gov-
ernmental functions from liability. The definitions cited above are espe-
cially in need of some qualification because they contain no limiting
adopted from Romsdahl v. Town of Long Lake, 175 Minn. 34, 36, 220 N.W.
166, 167 (1928) (mandamus action).
46. 256 Or. 485, 502, 475 P.2d 78, 86 (1970) (state immune from suit for
negligence in planning and designing highway). See text accompanying note 23
supra. Contra, State v. I'Anson, 529 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1974); State v. Abbott, 498
P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972); Breed v. Shaner, 562 P.2d 436 (Haw. 1977); Rogers v.
State, 51 Haw. 293, 459 P.2d 378 (1969); Sutton v. State Highway Dep't, 549
S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1977); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).
Other Oregon cases distinguished design from maintenance and held that there
is no immunity for negligent highway maintenance. Daugherty v. State Highway
Comm'n, 270 Or. 144, 526 P.2d 1005 (1974); Lanning v. State Highway
Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 310, 515 P.2d 1355 (1973). The Smith court unfortunately
concluded that the distinction between immune and nonimmune governmental
activities cannot be rationally drawn: "[T]his division must necessarily be arbitrary."
256 Or. at 499, 475 P.2d at 85 (emphasis added). Consequently, the cases fol-
lowing Smith have interpreted the exception to liability more broadly and more
erratically than courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the planning-operational
or undertaking tests. Wright v. Scappoose School Dist., 25 Or. App. 103, 548
P.2d 535 (1976) (decision not to remove a nonfunctional fire escape that created
a known hazard was ministerial); Keeland v. Yamhill County, 24 Or. App. 85,
545 P.2d 137 (1976) (prison official's decision to allow inmates to possess razor
blades, where plaintiff was injured when another inmate threw a razor blade at
him, is ministerial) (citing Smith as the "leading" Oregon case); Baker v. State Bd.
of Higher Educ., 20 Or. App. 277, 531 P.2d 716 (1975) (decision to hold a
school picnic at a certain park location was discretionary but maintenance of the
park was ministerial; park officials may be subject to liability when child at school
picnic was injured by horse); Donahue v. Bowers, 19 Or. App. 50, 526 P.2d 616
(1974) (firing of employee, even if malicious, is discretionary); Sullivan v. State,
14 Or. App. 254, 515 P.2d 194 (1973) (prison official's refusal to award inmate
208 days of "good time" was "a question of judgment of the prison officials and,
as such, becomes a discretionary decision"); Schlicting v. Bergstrom, 13 Or. App.
522, 511 P.2d 846 (1973) (public employer's discharge of a probationary
employee was within the employer's "unfettered discretion"); Baker v.
Straumfjord, 10 Or. App. 414, 500 P.2d 497 (1972) (physician's placement of
plaintiff on the third floor of an infirmary without tranquilizing him, guarding
him, or securing the window, with the result that he was injured in a fall or
jump from the window, found discretionary).
47. A thoughtful definition of the F.T.C.A.'s discretionary function exception
is found in Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1964):
The planning-level notion refers to decisions involving questidns of
policy, that is, the evaluation of factors such as the financial, political,
economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy.... The opera-
tions-level decision, on the other hand, involves decisions relating to
the normal day-to-day operations of the Government.
3951978]
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principle. Nearly any act or decision which is free from coercion could
be found to be immune under such definitions. Leading decisions in
several jurisdictions acknowledge the point that literal definitions are too
easily stretched to cover the field of potential liability: "[I]t would be
difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministe-
rial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its perfor-
mance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail."48
The "planning-operational" test suggested in Dalehite helps courts
analyze fact situations by focusing attention upon the act the official is
alleged to have done and allowing a separation of decisionmaking (which
is immune) from subsequent activities which merely implement that deci-
sionmaking (which are not immune). In Hansen v. City of St. Paul 49 the
plaintiff was hospitalized after being mauled by a pack of roaming dogs.
There had been seven reported dog bites in the previous thirteen
months, and at the time the plaintiff was attacked, officers investigating
a dogbite incident reported two hours earlier were taking a lunch break.
The court distinguished Silver 50 and held that the city was subject to
liability as its culpable failure to act was at the operational level rather
than the executive or administrative level.5 ' In State v. Webster 5 2 the
plaintiff alleged negligent failure to install a cattle guard at a freeway
entrance with the result that her husband was killed in a collision with a
horse at night. The court found that the state was subject to liability,
distinguishing Dalehite but applying a planning-operational test.53
Most courts that adopt a planning-operational distinction find it
necessary to use a supplemental guide to constrict the scope of "plan-
48. Ham v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468
(1920). The Ham quotation has found its way into many recent opinions, often
without acknowledgment of its source. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712,
720 (Alaska 1972); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788, 447 P.2d 352, 357, 73
Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1968); NeCasek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d
131, 135, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294, 297 (1965); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239,
246, 525 P.2d 228, 232 (1974). Abbott also cites Swanson v. United States, 229 F.
Supp. 217, 219 (N.D. Cal. 1964): "In a strict sense, every action of a government
employee, except perhaps a conditioned reflex action, involves the use of some
degree of discretion." It is this failure of conceptual limits that has plagued those
courts using a simple planning-operational test and has prompted some to adopt
a further guiding principle. See text accompanying note 70 infra. The limiting
consideration often takes the form of a rule that only a basic policy decision is so
sensitive as to preclude judicial review.
49. 298 Minn. 205, 214 N.W.2d 346 (1974).
50. 284 Minn. 266, 170 N.W.2d 206 (1969).
51. 298 Minn. at 212, 214 N.W.2d at 350. Cf. Williamson v. Cain, 245
N.W.2d 242, 244 (Minn. 1976), in which government agents tearing down an
abandoned house cracked the neighbor's basement wall in their operation of a
caterpillar and allowed a wall to fall against the neighbor's house. Although the
decision to demolish the house may have been discretionary, defendants' acts
were ministerial: "Their job was simple and definite-to remove a house."
52. 88 Nev. 690, 504 P.2d 1316 (1972).
53. Id. at 695, 504 P.2d at 1319-20.
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ning" in order to narrow the range of immunity, consistent with the
reasons for retaining immunity.54 Most of these courts adopt the rule
that only where a planning decision involves consideration of basic policy
factors will it be immune from tort liability. In State v. I'Anson 5 5 the state
was found liable for failure to place no-passing stripes on a highway.
The court relied on a planning-operational test. Central to the decision
was the finding that marking highways involves no "broad basic policy
decisions which come within the 'planning' category of decisions which
are expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government." For this
reason, I'Anson found that courts are competent to evaluate the proper
marking of a highway.5 6
Several California decisions may be said to adopt a planning-opera-
tional test coupled with the view that the purpose of the exception is to
protect officials only in the making of basic policy decisions. In Elton v.
County of Orange 5' the plaintiff alleged that the county negligently
screened the foster home in which she was placed, and that she became
the victim of physical and mental abuse as a result. The court found the
county's action was not sheltered from liability because its placement de-
cision did not involve basic policy considerations. 5I Hawaii's cases also
emphasize that an immune exercise of official discretion must involve
consideration of basic policy factors. 9 At least one Utah decision has
54. The problems created by resting decisions on the naked planning-opera-
tional distinction have been observed by at least one commentator:
Indeed, the distinction between activities at the "operational level" and
those at the "planning level" is susceptible of no greater precision in
definition than the distinction between activities which are "gov-
ernmental" and those which are "non-governmental" or "proprie-
tary"-a distinction which the realigned majority in the Indian Towing
case emphatically rejected as a quagmire of municipal law, based on
casuistries and requiring the reconciliation of the irreconcilable.
Peck, supra note 38, at 219. It is not so obvious as Peck supposed that the Indian
Towing majority rejected one unsatisfactory dichotomy in favor of an equally un-
workable one. The purpose of immunizing governmental functions was never so
narrowly circumscribed as the purpose of immunizing only discretionary func-
tions has come to be. See text accompanying note 85 infra.
55. 529 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1974).
56. Id. at 194. Cases using an "undertaking" test have also restricted immun-
ity to decisions involving basic policy judgment. See text accompanying note 70
infra.
57. 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970).
58. Id. at 1058, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31. See also Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub.
Co., 18 Cal. 3d 406, 556 P.2d 764, 134 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1976) (county clerk deci-
sion to discuss with reporters the release of impounded funds to plaintiff was not
a basic policy decision, so clerk's alleged defamation of plaintiff was not im-
munized as an exercise of discretion); Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 803, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969) (the decision when to call out the National
Guard during the 1965 Watts riots "constitutes the type of basic policy decision"
that should be immunized as an exercise of discretion).
59. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 283, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (four-hour delay in
removing sand blocking a highway culvert resulted in flooding of plaintiff's
3971978] RECENT CASES
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followed a similar approach. In Carroll v. State 60 over forty feet of aban-
doned road was torn out incident to the removal of four culverts, and
earthen berms were formed in place of the paved surface. The earth was
washed away and the plaintiffs were injured when their car plunged off
the pavement. The court rejected the defense that the decision to use
earthen berms was discretionary, found that no basic policy was involved
in that decision, and held that immunity does not extend to ministerial
implementation of basic policy decisions.A The court observed that
most of the cases imposing liability involve failure to warn of foreseeable
dangers.
62
Mason v. Bitton 63 illustrates the "basic policy decision" approach to
distinguishing planning from operational functions. Bitton led as many
as seven officers of the Washington State Patrol and the Seattle Police
Department on a frightening chase, being clocked at one intersection at
140 m.p.h. The police did not abandon their pursuit, and Britton's car
finally jumped a median strip, collided head-on with Mason's car, and
killed both drivers. Mason's estate sued Bitton's estate and the state was
joined as a defendant. The court unanimously held that the decisions to
pursue Bitton and to continue pursuit in the face of the risk it posed to
public safety were operational because those decisions did not involve
basic policy questions.
64
home; the decision to delay was found to be at the operational-level); Rogers v.
State, 51 Haw. 293, 298, 459 P.2d 378, 381 (1969) (court found that repainting
highway stripes "did not require evaluation of policies but involved implementa-
tion of decisions made in the everyday operation of governmental affairs").
60. 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).
61. Id. at 389, 496 P.2d at 891.
62. Id. But see notes 78 & 79 and accompanying text infra. This reasoning is
inconsistent with the later resolution of Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah
1976). The plaintiffs in Epting were the children of a woman who was allegedly
battered, raped, and murdered by an escapee from the work-release program of
a Utah prison. The Utah Supreme Court disposed of the case by finding the
decision whether to use work release programs was "within the discretion of the
prison authorities to decide." Id. at 244. The dissenters argued that the majority
ignored that portion of plaintiffs' complaint alleging negligence in failure to
warn the deceased of the inmate's escape under circumstances known to prison
officials making the inmate a special threat to the safety of the deceased. In the
four years between Caroll and Epting, the Utah Supreme Court's sensitivity to
cases involving failure to warn of foreseeable dangers and to the distinction be-
tween plans and operations appears to have faded; that discretion was exercised
in choosing to use work-release programs does not determine whether such dis-
cretion was exercised in the choice not to warn plaintiff of the inmate's escape.
63. 85 Wash. 2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975).
64. Id. at 328, 534 P.2d at 1365. There is no express exception to gov-
ernmental liability in WASH. REv. CODE § 4.92.090 (West Supp. 1976), yet the
Washington courts observe an exception which is similar to the one fashioned in
Jones. This exception was created in Evangelical United Brethren Church v.
State, 67 Wash. 2d 246. 407 P.2d 440 (1965). Evangelical proceeded on the
theory that is is not tortious to govern (a phrase borrowed from Jackson's dissent
398 [Vol. 43
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The "undertaking" rule is illustrated by Indian Towing where the
Supreme Court held the Coast Guard liable for the exercise of due care
once a service had been undertaken, even though there initially was no
duty to provide that service. In Connelly v. State 6 5 the court employed a
form of this test. The plaintiff was the owner of a marina and water-
front apartments which were damaged by flood. He had relied on the
California State Department of Water Resources forecast that the water
would not rise above twenty-four feet when he set his docks to withstand
a water level rise up to twenty-six feet. The water reached twenty-nine
feet for two weeks and the owner sued for property damage. Although
the state had no duty to issue flood forecasts, because it undertook to do
so, it was held to a standard of reasonable care. 66
in Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 57) and emphasized that the statute only makes govern-
ment liable for its torts:
"[T]he legislative, judicial, and purely executive processes of govern-
ment, including as well the essential quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
or discretionary acts and decisions within the framework of such proc-
esses, cannot and should not, from the standpoint of public policy and
the maintenance of the integrity of our system of government, be
characterized as tortious however unwise, unpopular, mistaken, or
neglectful a particular decision or act might be."
67 Wash. 2d at 253, 407 P.2d at 444. Washington cases use a litany of four
questions designed to permit finding immunity only for an act, omission, or deci-
sion which necessarily involved the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment
or expertise by an authorized agency and only if the act, omission, or decision is
essential to the accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program, or ob-
jective. See Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (1975); King
v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
An exactly parallel argument was used in the construction of Ohio's 1974
tort claims act, OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN. § 2743.2(A) (Page Supp. 1976) to supply a
discretionary function exception to an otherwise unqualified statutory waiver of
immunity. In Adamov v. State, 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d 661, 75 Ohio Op.
2d 41 (1975), the plaintiff was attacked by a juvenile who was released to his
parents' custody three months earlier by the Ohio Youth Commission. The court
found the decision to release was essential to the attainment of a basic gov-
ernmental policy or objective and therefore immune. Accord, Harris v. State, 48
Ohio Misc. 27, 358 N.E.2d 639, 2 Ohio Op. 3d 358 (1976). It is interesting to
observe that at least one state construing a statute with an express discretionary
function exception to liability finds broader liability in a negligent-release-of-in-
mate context than Washington and Ohio have found under statutes providing
for unqualified tort liability. In State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1970) a
husband and wife sued the state after the wife was raped by an inmate of
Peavine Honor Camp. The court held that the question of negligence was prop-
erly a jury question.
65. 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1970).
66. Id. at 751, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 262. Accord, McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles,
70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389 (plaintiff was struck by a car
while standing in an intersection with a police officer who was investigating an
earlier collision involving the plaintiff; the court found no immunity as the in-
jury resulted from the officer's negligence in performance subsequent to the dis-
cretionary decision to investigate); Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d
938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964) (sheriff's failure to warn plaintiffs decedent as
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In State v. Stanley 67 employees of the State Department of Fish and
Game took possession of a fishing boat after an official discovered an
under-sized crab in the catch. State employees failed to notice that the
ship was taking water and it sank. The court found that any discretion
was exhausted in the state's decision to take possession of the vessel and
the state was subject to liability for damages to it.68
In Harrigan v. City of Reno 69 the elderly plaintiff stooped to retrieve
her parking stub and the wind blew her off a drop several feet deep at
promised if a prisoner who had threatened the life of plaintiff's decedent were
released; the court found that when the sheriff promised to warn he had
exhausted the only discretion involved). The leading California case of Johnson
v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) is more difficult
to classify because its language is consistent with both the planning-operational
and the undertaking test. The plaintiff was attacked with a butcher knife by a 16
year old placed in her home by the Placement Officer of the Youth Authority
who elected not to warn the plaintiff of the youth's violent tendencies. The court
found that although a decision to parole is immune under the statute, the failure
of the parole officer to give appropriate warnings was not. See K. DAVIs, AD-
MINISTRATIvE LAW TREATIsa 846, 858, 860, 870 (Supp. 1970). But see Comment,
Separation of Powers and the Discretionay Function Exception: Political Question in Tort
Litigation Against the Government. 56 IowA L. REv. 930, 959-61 (1971).
67. 506 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1973).
68. The failure to exercise proper care [in seizing the ship] ... does not
rise to the 'level of governmental policy decisions' to which the dis-
cretionary function immunity from suit applies. Stated otherwise,
the acts occurred at the operational, rather than at the planning
level, and consequently do not come under the umbrella of dis-
cretionary function immunity.
Id. at 1291. This quotation provides an example of the way in which a rigid
classification of decisions, separating cases using a planning-operational test from
those using an undertaking test, is unrealistic. Some decisions contain language
consistent with both tests. Similarly, one may describe a broad range of fact situ-
ations using the grammatical form of either test: (a) Although the decision to do
X was made at the planning level, the government may be liable for subsequent
negligence in operations executing that decision; (b) Although the agency was
under no obligation to do X, once it undertook to do X, it was bound to do so
with reasonable care. The planning formulation (a) stresses time sequence; the
undertaking formulation (b) emphasizes the relation of means to ends. It is not
surprising that the results in courts using either test compare closely, insofar as
ends are commonly selected in advance of implementing the means to attain
them. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 107.
A more recent Alaska case which may be characterized as using the under-
taking test is State v. Morris, 555 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1976). State inspectors ig-
nored a safety infraction after undertaking to inspect a scaffolding and caused
the death of a workman who fell from the scaffolding. The court found the
inspection was operational and not immune, although the decision whether or
not to inspect a particular project was discretionary.
69. 86 Nev. 678, 475 P.2d 94 (1970).
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the edge of a city parking lot. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the
city was not immune from suit and reasoned that although the decision
to construct a parking lot is a policy decision, negligent omission of
guardrails and warning signs is actionable once construction is under-
taken.
70
In Coffey v. City of Milwaukee 71 the plaintiff sued the city for loss of
property in an office building fire and alleged negligent inspection of
standpipes located in the building for firefighting purposes. The au-
thorities had undertaken to inspect the standpipes but had failed to find
or order corrections of deficiencies. The court held that, whatever the
status of a decision to conduct inspections, the subsequent judgments of
inspectors were not quasi-judicial: "Only when it is determined that vio-
lations do exist, might quasi-judicial actions take place involving en-
forcement procedures.7 ? Coffey cites the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
324A for its definition of liability to third persons for negligent perfor-
mance of an undertaking. 73
In a few cases the courts have found there can be no discretionary
immunity where the officer or entity involved violates a duty imposed by
70. Id. at 681, 475 P.2d at 96. The court in LaFever v. City of Sparks, 88
Nev. 282, 496 P.2d 750 (1972) cited Harrigan to support its finding that the
failure to replace a stop sign the absence of which had been noticed by a traffic
officer a half hour before the plaintiff was involved in a collision was discre-
tionary and therefore immune from liability. It is not clear how the undertaking
rule found in Harrington can support the rule that failure to restore a missing
traffic sign is not actionable. Contra, Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis. 2d 352, 130
N.W.2d 835 (1964). It is submitted that the failure of the Nevada cases to restrict
findings of immunity to basic policy determinations renders the undertaking test
a less predictable guide for fixing the limits of liability. Adams v. State used the
undertaking test and restricted immunity to cases involving basic policy decisions.
555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976). The plaintiffs were the injured and the families of
those killed in a hotel fire which occurred after the Department of Public Safety
had undertaken inspection of the premises. The state was held to a duty to in-
spect with care and to follow up on hazards already seen. Citing Indian Towing
and State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712 (1972), the court said:
The thread common to the many cases on the issue is that the basic
policy decision to undertake an activity is immune, but the execution is
not. In this case, the discretionary act could be described as the deci-
sion to inspect the Gold Rush Hotel; the negligent performance of that
inspection would then be an operational or ministerial act, and thus
not immune.
555 P.2d at 243-44.
71. 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). Coffey applied a statutory codifi-
cation of the exception language used in the decision which abrogated gov-
ernmental tort immunity in Wisconsin, Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d
26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962). Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.43(3) (West 1966)
provides: "No suit shall be brought against any political corporation, gov-
ernmental subdivision or any agency thereof... for acts done in, the exercise of
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
72. 74 Wis. 2d at 534-35, 247 N.W.2d at 137.
73. Id. at 540, 247 N.W.2d at 139 n.2.
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law. In Ramos v. County of Madera 74 the plaintiffs were recipients of wel-
fare payments who allegedly were told by the county welfare department
that they were required to work in the grape harvest under substandard
conditions or their assistance would be terminated. Disabled and re-
tarded children and children who were regularly attending school were
among those allegedly required to work. Some children were harassed
by welfare agents over the telephone. Assistance to nineteen families was
terminated. The court refused the county's claim of immunity and held
that, as eligibility standards were fixed at the state level by the Welfare
and Institutions Code, the county had no discretion to vary those stan-
dards.7-
In Campbell v. City of Bellevue 76 poorly insulated wires were con-
nected to electric lights in a creek. Discovery of an electrocuted raccoon
prompted inspection of the wiring, but the inspector failed to reinspect
to see that the wires were properly disconnected. Five months later the
occupant of the faultily wired premises turned on the wrong switch in
his garage and a neighbor's child playing in the creek received paralyz-
ing electrical shocks. The child's mother tried to rescue him and was
electrocuted. The court found that a municipal ordinance required that
noncomplying installations be disconnected; therefore, the failure to re-
quire disconnection was not immune.
In Sutton v. State Highway Department 7 7 the plaintiff's decedent was
driving his car behind a truck and either hit or veered into a bridge to
avoid hitting an object bounced from the back of the truck when the
truck struck a depression in the road. Citing a Texas statute making
maintenance of highways the responsibility of the state highway depart-
ment, the court rejected the department's defense of immunity.
Utah has followed the converse of the rule applied in the California,
Washington, and Texas cases. In Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp. 7s a waitress
was issued a work permit after approval of her miniature chest x-ray by
one of two physicians hired by the city to examine such x-rays. The
plaintiff lost employment when she later was discovered to have tuber-
culosis. She filed suit and alleged that the city had undertaken to diag-
nose such ailments and negligently carried out that service. The court
sidestepped the question whether there was an undertaking to diagnose.
74. 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
75. Id. at 693, 484 P.2d at 99-100, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 427. See Morris v. County
of Matin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1977) (an injured
employee unable to recover damages from a bankrupt employer sued the county
for failure to require as a condition of issuing his employer a building permit
that the employer file certification of workmen's compensation insurance; the
court found that the county had a legal duty to require the workmen's compen-
sation certificate and that the county's failure to require it was nondiscretionary).
76. 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975).
77. 549 S.W. 2d 59 (Tex. 1977).
78. 26 Utah 2d 78, 484 P.2d 1200 (1971).
[Vol. 43402
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It found that a Utah statute gave the city power to regulate and to issue
or not issue permits, and that the city's action was therefore discretion-
ary and sheltered from liability.79
Apart from the question of the manner in which the stated excep-
tions to liability will be worked out in the courts, there is the suggestion
in Jones that another type of impediment to suits against the government
may be recognized. s0 The Missouri Supreme Court attempted to distin-
guish immunity from tort liability, which it judicially abrogated, and
governmental entities' "immunity from suit," which arises from a lack of
legislative consent. An entity's immunity from suit is waived if the words
''may sue and be sued" appear in the statute creating the governmental
entity.8 ' In O'Dell Judge Finch cited pre-abrogation cases not involving
torts that declared that the state may not be sued without its consent, but
he refrained from confronting the question whether that rule is inde-
pendent of the rule of governmental tort immunity.s2 Only one state
cited by Judge Finch observed such an esoteric distinction when not
compelled to do so by a constitutional provision requiring legislative con-
sent to suit. Spanel v. Mounds View School District 3 abrogated entity im-
munity as to municipalities in Minnesota, but retained immunity as to
the state itself in the absence of legislative consent to being sued. The
same year that O'Dell was decided, however, Nieting v. Blondell 8 4 judi-
cially abrogated state sovereign immunity in Minnesota as well. Con-
sequently, the distinction so delicately drawn in Jones does not appear to
be observed in any state that is not forced to do so by the dilemma
posed in the conflict between a public policy that the government be
liable for its torts and a constitution that requires legislative consent to
suit. Because Missouri's constitution does not require such hairsplitting,
it is to be hoped that, should a governmental entity without the words
"may sue or be sued" legislatively inserted in its charter be named as a
defendant, the Missouri court will finish the job of interring the doctrine
of governmental immunity it stopped short of burying in Jones. Retain-
ing immunity for these entities where no such statutory phrase appears
is not consistent with the policy of spreading the "hidden" costs (re-
coveries for tortious injuries) of governing over the class of persons ben-
efited by government. It is questionable whether the fortuity of having
79. The decision is unjustifed because the plaintiff did not complain that
issuing her a permit was negligent, but that issuing her a permit implied a cer-
tain diagnosis of her lung condition which was negligently carried out and er-
roneous. The discretion of the city to issue a permit is simply immaterial to the
question whether misfeasance in diagnosis is immune from tort liability. See also
Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970).
80. 557 S.W.2d at 230.
81. Id. at 230.
82. 521 S.W. 2d at 421.
83. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
84. 235 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1975).
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certain words in the charter of a tortfeasor entity is a fair ground for
distinguishing among plaintiffs; a plaintiff cannot choose the language in
the charter of the entity whose agent runs over him.
Jones unequivocally represents a switch in the judicial view of the
question of governmentaY liability from general immunity with qualifica-
tions to general liability with narrowly defined exceptions: "[H]ence-
forth, so far as governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the
rule is liability-the exception is immunity." 85 As it is no longer consi-
dered public policy that an injured individual should bear the burden of
a loss incident to the day-to-day operations of government, but rather
that such costs should be spread over all those who benefit from gov-
ernmental operations, the exceptions to liability must be read narrowly.
The exceptions, however, serve recognized purposes and should be read
broadly enough to protect certain governmental activities from judicial
scrutiny.
The reasons for treating a limited class of governmental decisions as
immune from suit or as nontortious have as much to do with the organi-
zational limitations of the judicial forum as they do with the functional
requirements of efficient exercise of executive, legislative or judicial
functions. Courts are neither authorized nor designed to review all gov-
ernmental decisions. The courts are not permitted, by the the policies un-
derlying the division of governmental labors into three distinct branches,
to appropriate the essential decisionmaking powers of correlative
branches of government under the guise of tort adjudication. The evil of
such unchecked exercise of power is the risk of of abuse inherent in all
centralized authority. Neither are the courts equipped to evaluate the
wisdom of executive and legislative decisions. A court cannot hold inves-
tigative hearings to determine the need for or probable efficacy of pur-
suing a certain course, but must confine itself to case-by-case conflict
resolution.
Other considerations dictate the reservation of immunity from tort
liability of judicial functions. Courts are designed to resolve controver-
sies, not to compound them. Numerous procedural rules are dictated by
a concern to avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial effort. Oppor-
tunities for appeal or for collateral attack of a judgment are the rem-
edies afforded a party for review of allegedly wrongful adjudications.
Although the adequacy of these vehicles may be disputed, it is beyond
dispute that open-ended review would involve cumbersome multiplica-
tion of judicial functions. Allowing tort liability for judicial functions also
might permit an even greater disparity than now exists between the abil-
ity of the wealthy and that of the poor to secure meaningful recourse
through the courts.
85. 557 S.W.2d at 230.
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The decisions discussed herein show that some states have been able
to apply exceptions to liability in the wake of the abrogation of immunity
in a responsible and clear-sighted manner, sensitive to the purposes out-
lined above. The best decisions have recognized the fluidity of the plan-
ning-operational or undertaking tests and have adopted either of these
tests. These decisions have expressly limited application of any exception
to liability to meet the articulated purposes of retaining a residue of im-
munity and have found immunity only if the injury can be said to have
resulted from a basic policy decision. Courts careful enough to incorpo-
rate all three of these features in their opinions are more likely to
achieve consistency in their decisions and are less likely to expand the
exception to governmental liability beyond its proper scope. Because
such models of responsible interpretation exist in the case law, it would
be prudent for the Missouri General Assembly to follow the lead of
other states in enacting a waiver of immunity statute modeled after the
F.T.C.A. which incorporates an exception for discretionary or for legis-
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